Combined, the Kinder Morgan family was thethird largest energy company in North America, with an estimated combinedenterprise value of ~$140 billion. Among other assets, the Kinder Morganfamily owned the largest natural gas network in North America.

合并之后的金德摩根公司是北美最大的能源企业，企业价值估计为1400亿美元。就其它资产而言，金德摩根母公司拥有北美最大的天然气网络。

Yet on August 10, 2014, Kinder Morganannounced that it was shutting down its MLP and rolling them up into the mainpublic company. Why would they do this?

然而在2014年8月10号，金德摩根宣布关闭MLP公司回归到主要的上市公司里。为什么要这样做？

By 2011, its MLP, Kinder Morgan Partners(KMP), was in the high splits. The GP was earning more than 50% of totaldistributions to unit holders. Further, over 100% of cash not neededimmediately by the business was being distributed out. How much did thisleave for growth investments? Not a whole lot:

在2011年时，金德摩根的MLP公司，也即金德摩根合伙公司，就处于高分位点。普通合伙人所得分红高于单位信托合伙人所得分红的50%。再者，公司当时不需要用上的现金几乎100%被分配掉了。这样一来给投资增长留下来的钱还剩多少呢？必然所剩无几。

Kinder Morgan Partners, Discretionary CashFlows, 2011-2013

Source: Company filings via Sentieo.com

Further, with the GP in the high splits, theMLPs cost of capital was enormous and the corresponding hurdle rate for newinvestments severely limited the universe of accretive investments. Hereis a slide from a Kinder Morgan investor presentation showing the return tominority unitholders and shareholders from a new investment in the MLPstructure and in the more traditional corporate structure:

再者，当普通投资者分红较多时，MLP企业的资本成本很高昂，对应的新投资项目的要求回报率限制了累计投资。如下所示，金德摩根投资者关系展示PPT分别展示了在MLP模式里和更为传统的公司里少数单位信托证券持有者及股东得到的回报。

Kinder Morgan opted to hop off the MLPTreadmill rather than extend the pain. In 2014, they rolled up their MLPsinto the Sponsor, effectively reversing years of drop downs.

金德摩根选择跳下MLP跑步机结束痛苦。2014年时，他们把MLP企业还给了赞助商，从而有效地扭亏为盈。

Conflicts of Interest

利益冲突

When we take a minority position inpublically traded companies, we always face the risk that the business is beingrun for the benefit of the majority owner and to the detriment of minorityowners. However, this risk is dramatically heightened if none of thetraditional protections for minority ownership are in place. Such is thecase with MLPs

一旦我们持有少量上市公司的股份，我们会经常面临公司损耗小股东利益为大股东谋利的情况。一旦小股东没有传统保护措施，这种风险会严重加强。MLP企业就如此。

a. FiduciaryDuty Waived

受托责任免除

As discussed above, MLPs are organized aslimited partnerships rather than the more common corporation. MLPs takefull advantage of the fact that Delaware law does not require GPs to act in thebest interests of the LP. Therefore, as shocking as this sounds, the GPmay act free of any duty or obligation to the MLP or its limited partners. Forexample, the PBFX 10-K states: “Our general partner and its affiliates,including PBF Energy, have conflicts of interest with us and limited fiduciaryduties to us and our unitholders, and they may favor their owninterests to the detriment of us and our other common unitholders.”(emphasis added) This provision alone is enough to scare us away fromMLPs

正如之前论述的，MLP企业采取的是有限责任合伙制，这跟普通的公司制不一样。MLP企业很好地利用了特拉华公司法不要求普通合伙人为有限合伙人的利益服务的规定。因此，即便听起来很耸人听闻，普通合伙人对MLP公司、或者是有限合伙人根本不需要承担任何责任或义务。例如，PBFX的年报中如是说：“我们的普通合伙人极其合伙公司，包括PBF能源公司，同我方有利益冲突，对我方及单位信托承证券持有者承担有限的受托责任。其有可能以损害我方、及我方其他普通单位信托证券持有者的利益来满足其自身利益。”（再次强调）单单这个条款就足以让我们对MLP企业望而却步。

b. IDRsMean That Deals Can Be Accretive To The GP And Not The LP

IDR(激励分配权利)意味着普通合伙人可享受交易的增值性，但是有限合伙人享受不到。

The way IDRs are calculated makes itpossible for actions to be taken that are accretive to the GP but notnecessarily to existing LPs. Distributions paid to the GP are not based on thedistribution per LP unit but the gross distribution to LPs. Therefore,even if the distribution per unit remains the same, the GP will receive agreater distribution. Here is a simplified example: