IDR获得的方式让普通投资者得以采取行动获得增值回报，但是对现有的有限投资者来说并非如此。普通合伙人获得的分红并非基于有限合伙人获得的分红，而是基于所有有限合伙人的总分红所得。因此，即使每个单位分红额度一样，普通合伙人还是能拿到更多的分红。有个简单的例子：

Notice that the equity funded acquisition,results in a 10% increase in the distribution to the GP while the LP remainsthe same.

比如股权出资收购会使普通合伙人的分红增加，而有限合伙人的保持不变。

c. DropDowns Are Not At Arms-Length

下跌并非公平的

Drop downs are often touted as a benefit ofMLPs. For example, the amount of assets available for drop down by theSponsor is used as a rough proxy for the future growth of the MLP. But,drop downs create a terrible conflict of interest. How can aminority owner of the MLP have any assurance that both parties are negotiatinga fair deal?

股价下跌往往被吹捧成是MLP企业所受的益处。比如，赞助者提供的支撑下跌的资产往往被当作促进MLP企业未来增长的大致替代品。但是下跌造成了非常严重的利益冲突。MLP企业的小股东如何能保证双方能协商出一个公平的交易呢。

d. Lackof Voting Rights

没有投票权

Unlike common shareholders, MLP LPs haveseverely restricted voting rights and no vote for the board of directors. 

跟普通股东不同，MLP有限合伙人的投票权严重被限制，董事会根本没有投票权。

Other Ways Management Can Rip You Off

管理层欺骗你的其它的方式

Management has several other ways it can ripoff the minority owners

管理层也能通过其它一些方法欺骗小股东.

1. AccountingGames

财务游戏

The most straightforward method managementhas to rip off investors is playing games with the numbers. As statedearlier, MLPs are required to distribute all available cash. However, allavailable cash is not a term defined under GAAP. This gives managementsignificant leeway to pump up the numbers.

管理层欺骗投资者的最直接的办法就是拿数字做文章。 正如我们早先所说，MLP企业必须把所有的可支配现金分配出去。但是所有可支配现金并非GAAP会计准则下有明确定义的一个条款。这就给了管理层很多机会去拿数字做文章。

Below is a typical calculation of distributablecash flow by an MLP. 

下面是一家MLP公司典型的计算可自由支配现金的方式。

Source: ARCX 10-K

A couple of items stick out. First,the “one-time non-recurring” expenses sure do seem to recur a lot. Buteven more importantly, they are true expenses and a reduction to cash. Why are they being added back?

有几个条款很醒目。首先是“一次性非经常性”开销确实经常出现。但更重要的是它们都是实打实的花销，是对现金的消耗，为什么又被加了回来？

Second, “maintenance capital expenditures”is not a term defined under GAAP. This gives management a lot of leewayto play around with the numbers. Per the 10-K, management simply definesmaintenance capital expenditures as “(i) clean, inspect and repair storagetanks; (ii) clean and paint tank exteriors; (iii) inspect and upgradevapor recovery/combustion units; (iv) upgrade fire protection systems;(v) evaluate certain facilities regulatory programs; (vi) inspect andrepair cathodic protection systems; (vii) inspect and repair tankinfrastructure; and (viii) make other general facility repairs asrequired.” This last point is vague enough to cover (in good years) ornot cover (in bad years) just about any capital expenditure.

第二，“维护资本支出”也并非GAAP会计准则里有确切定义的项。这给管理层很大空间玩弄数字游戏。每一份年报中，管理层都单纯地对维护资本开支给出这样的定义：“(i) 清洁、检查、修理储罐；(ii) 清洁和粉刷罐表面；(iii)检查升级蒸汽回收和燃机组；(iv)升级火力保护系统；(vi) 检查和修复阴极保护系统；(vii)检查和修复储存设施；(viii)按要求修复其它设施。” 最后的模糊项足够覆盖掉（在收益不错的年份里）任何资本开支，或者不包含（在收益差的年份里）这些资本开支。

Maintenance Capex, however, is intended torepresent the cost inherent in maintaining the Company’s current capacity, andis generally funded from operating revenues. Because of that, expendituresclassified as Maintenance Capex reduce the funds that may be distributed to thegeneral partner and the unitholders. The GP has a powerful incentive toclassify whatever expenses possible as Expansion Capex, as that leads to alarger payment for the GP.

但是维修预算本该是维护公司现有运作能力的开支，它应该来自于运营收入。因此，被归作维修预算的成本应该减去本该分配给普通合伙人和单位信托证券持有人的现金。普通合伙人有强大的动机将一切花销都尽可能归类为维修预算，这样以来分给普通合伙人的利润会更高。

Depreciation, depletion and amortization(“DD&A”) costs—reflective as they are of the anticipated expense ofmaintaining assets—should roughly mirror Maintenance Capex. Defying logic, theMLPs we looked at all had Maintenance Capex amounts far lower than theirDD&A. In fact, the average ratio in 2015 was just 30%.

折旧，损耗，摊销费用(“DD&A”)——反映了预期的资产维修费用—跟维修预期大致成正比。我们观察到的MLP企业不符合此逻辑，其维修预期费用都远远低于DD&A费用。事实上，2015年的平均比率才到30%。

2. LongTerm Contracts can mask deteriorating economics.

1. 长期合约可以掩盖经济衰退现象。