中国石化新闻网讯 据油价网5月20日报道，尽管EIA和其他机构预计，到2024年底，美国页岩产量将上升，但有一些令人担忧的迹象表明，产量可能已经在放缓。

美国页岩产量的两个主要驱动因素，即DUC（新钻井未完井）开钻量和钻机数量正在下降，而2022年82%的钻井已取代传统生产。

由于分析师已经警告称，今年晚些时候油价将飙升，美国页岩产量的大幅下降将为任何反弹增加显著的上行空间。

如果没有价格信号导致钻井量大幅增加，页岩油增产的时代就不会有太大的发展空间。这一价格信号与地缘政治冲突暴发时市场收到的信号类似，2022年1月至6月，美国页岩油田增加了153台钻机。相反，随着市场适应石油和天然气的供应量减少，以及对经济实力的担忧使需求受到质疑，价格在今年剩余时间开始疲软。

随着我们接近2023年年中，WTI价格大多保持在70至80美元的区间，延续了2022年第四季度末确立的模式。在接下来的几个月里，没有什么能打破这种模式，但如果我们再往前看一点，在接下来的6到8个月里，我们可以为美国国内产能的戏剧性下降提供理由。

美国勘探与生产形势的微妙变化

2019年至2021年12月的低油价导致DUC从约4000口下降到1446口。在此期间，由于油价低于每桶70美元，石油公司迫切希望获得收入并需要控制成本，因此转向维持DUC数量来维持产量。2022年1月后，石油和天然气价格上涨推动了钻探的快速增长，并随着时间的推移减弱了DUC减少的趋势。根据月度EIA钻井产能报告，从2023年1月起，DUC的减少和钻探都有所下降，页岩油产量基本持平，约930万桶/天。

直到2021年6月，钻探活动才开始增加，直到2022年6月，专用于石油的钻机数量才超过600台。据估计，要使产量增长超过页岩油的自然递减率(通常为每年40%)，就必须达到这样的速度。

自去年年中以来，我们已经有大约600台石油钻机启动正常生产。自去年6月22日以来，美国页岩产量已从870万桶增加到940万桶，即增加了约70万桶。这每月不到5.8万桶的新产量，意味着2022年钻探的约1.4万口井中，约82%取代了传统生产。但是从现在开始，情况只会变得更糟。

接下来会发生什么？

从2023年1月开始，每月新增石油的速度都会下降。这与自1月21日以来，随着产量降至50桶/天以下且石油钻机数量降至600台以下，，第一批投入使用的DUC正在枯竭的事实是一致的。这意味着推动产量达到疫情后高点的两个驱动因素——DUC减少和钻机数量增加——正在退却，这只会产生一种可能的结果。页岩油日产量正接近一个拐点，可能很快就会开始快速下降，如果不大幅增加新井的钻探速度，这种趋势将无法逆转，而目前的市场产能是无法持续的。

郝芬 译自 油价网

原文如下：

U.S. Shale Production Is Set For A Rapid Decline

While the EIA and others see U.S. shale production rising through the end of 2024, there are some worrying signs that production may already be slowing.

The two main drivers of U.S. shale production, DUC withdrawals and the rig count, are in decline while 82% of wells drilled in 2022 were to replace legacy production.

With analysts already warning of an oil price spike later this year, a dramatic drop in U.S. shale production will add significant upside to any rally.

I have argued in several Oilprice articles, and most recently in February 2023, that the era of increasing output from shale wells did not have much more room to run absent a price signal that caused a huge increase in drilling. A price signal similar to the one the market received with the onset of the Ukraine invasion, that added 153 rigs in U.S. shale plays from January to June of 2022. Instead, as the market adapted to the loss of Russian oil and gas, and worries about the strength of the economy cast doubt on demand, prices began to soften throughout the rest of the year.

As we approach the midpoint of 2023, WTI prices have mostly stayed in a $70-$80 range, continuing a pattern that established itself in late Q-4, 2022. There is nothing in the next few months that will interrupt this pattern, but if we look a little farther out, in the next six to eight months, we can make a case for a transformative drop in U.S. domestic production. 

Subtle changes in the U.S. E&P landscape

Low oil prices from 2019 through December, of 2021 drove a decline in DUCs from ~4,000 to 1,446, more than 75%. During this period, oil companies desperate for revenue and needing to control costs thanks to oil prices below $70 per barrel, turned to DUCs to maintain output. Post-January 2022, higher oil and gas prices drove a rapid increase in drilling, and attenuated the trend toward DUC activation as the year wore on. From January of 2023, both DUC withdrawals and drilling have declined and shale output has essentially flatlined around 9,300 mm BOPD, according to the monthly EIA-Drilling Productivity Report.

Drilling doesn’t begin to pick up until June 2021 and it’s not until June 2022 that the rig count-dedicated to oil, rises above 600. The rate at which I estimate is necessary to grow production beyond the natural decline rate, ~40% annually, of shale typically.

We have had about 600 oil rigs turning to the right since the middle of last year. Since June 22, we have gone from 8.7 mm to 9.4 mm BOPD in shale output, or about 700K BOPD of increase. That's less than 58K per month of new production, meaning that about 82% of the ~14K wells drilled in 2022 were to replace legacy production. It only gets worse from here.”

What happens from here?

I’ll start with another graph. Beginning in January of 2023, you see a sharp decline in the rate of new oil added per month. This is consistent with the fact that the first DUCs since Jan-21, are watering out as production falls below 50 BOPD, just as the oil-rig count has dropped below 600. This means that the two drivers - DUC withdrawals and an increasing rig count - that have propelled production to post-Covid highs are in retreat, and there is only one outcome possible. Daily shale output is nearing an inflection point and may soon start a rapid decline, that will be impossible to reverse, absent a huge increase in the rate of drilling new wells that cannot be sustained in today’s market.